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Legal Ethics and Class Actions:
Problems, Tactics and
Judicial Responses
By RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no procedural innovation has generated more con-
troversy than the class action. As Professor Arthur Miller has ob-
served, debate over "class action problem [s]" has raged at several
different levels.' For example, opponents and proponents of class
actions disagree on whether such actions produce socially desir-
able results in an economical fashion and whether an already over-
burdened judiciary can handle the additional supervisory demands
of the class action.2 Recently, a somewhat more ideological
dialogue has addressed the merit of publicly funded class ac-
tions. 3 Such questions arise only indirectly in the context of class
action litigation. However, a certain hostility toward class actions
has surfaced on the front lines, usually prompted by charges of
"abuse" of the class action or charges of ethical misconduct directed
at lawyers prosecuting class actions. Professor Miller has noted:
"[Flrom 1969 to approximately 1973 or perhaps 1974, antipathy
to the class action became palpable .... The defense bar devel-
oped numerous litigation techniques to make the class action ven-
ture as unattractive as possible, including attacking class counsel's
professional conduct." 4
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, Ohio
State University. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of his research
assistant, Jeffrey B. Hunt, J.D. candidate 1983, University of Kentucky.
1 Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 HIav. L. REy. 664 (1979).
2 Id. at 666-67.
3 Abascal, Class Actions: The Right Role For Legal Services: Federally Funded
Class Actions Are Vital If Truly Equal Justice Is to Prevail, 2 CAL. LAw. 842 (1982).
4 Miller, supra note 1, at 679.
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This Article examines some of the ethical dilemmas that arise
in privately funded class action litigation, 5 typical judicial re-
sponses to charges of ethical misconduct, and tactics that, at least
to some extent, have been encouraged by such responses.
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
A. The Role of Counsel in Class Litigation
One of the prerequisites to maintaining a class action is that
"the representative party [establish that he or she] will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 6 This threshold re-
quirement of "adequate representation" has a constitutional7 di-
mension: "[a] judgment in a class action binds the class where the
class [has] been adequately represented or where they actually par-
ticipated in the litigation. An absent member will not be bound
if he proves the procedure did not adequately insure the protec-
tion of his interests."8
Accordingly, a growing majority of judicial opinions has called
for closer scrutiny of the representative party or parties, osten-
sibly to insure that class actions will be litigated vigorously and
that conflicts between the interests of such representatives and the
interests of class members will be avoided.9 The published opi-
nions of trial judges who refused to certify actions for class treat-
ment could be compiled into a useful checklist for counsel oppos-
ing class certification. Some judges have required that the repre-
sentative party have a "keen interest in the progress and outcome
of the litigation."'1 Others have recently held that a named
plaintiff must have some knowledge of the class claims and class
action procedures." Even the named plaintiff's health has been
5 This article omits any discussion of ethical problems encountered by legal services
or legal aid attorneys.
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
7 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-43 (1940).
8 Laskey v. International Union (UAW), 638 F.2d 954, 956 (6th Cir. 1981).
9 Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: Fools for Clients, 4 AM. Jua. TRIAL ADvoc. 243,
262-63 (1980).
10 In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
11 Massengill v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 181, 186 (N.D. InI. 1980); Seiden v.
Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 688-89 (N.D. IMI. 1976). But see Brown v. Cameron-Brown
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considered in determining if the action would be prosecuted vigor-
ously.12 Similarly, a named plaintiff may be deemed an "inade-
quate" representative if he has been shown to be an unreliable
witness." Named plaintiffs who were unable or unwilling to
bear the costs of the class litigation, 14 those who insisted on more
than a pro rata share of any recovery, 15 and those who were sub-
ject to counterclaims exceeding the representative's potential, in-
dividual recovery 16 have also been denied class certification. 17
Thus, there seems to be a basic requirement in all such decisions
that the representative party be more than a convenient fiction.'8
Co., 30 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 1181 (E.D. Va. 1980) (lack of knowledge of an-
titrust claims on plaintiff's part did not justify dismissal) (dismissed on other grounds),
reo'd, 31 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 1362 (4th Cir. 1981) (dismissal under Rule 83
for meritless claim reversed, Rule 56 applicable).
12 Roundtree v. Cincinnati Bell, 90 F.R.D. 7, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
13 Panziere v. Wolf, 32 FED. R. SEEV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 1277 (2d Cir. 1981); Armour
v. City of Anniston, 89 F.R.D. 331, 332 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Stull v. Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702,
704 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Cobb v. Avon Prod., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 652, 655 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (character of named plaintiff questioned); Amswiss Int'l Corp. v. Heublein, Inc.,
69 F.R.D. 663, 670 (N.D. G. 1975) (plaintiff not qualified representative because not
credible witness).
14 In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D. Md. 1982);
Parker v. George Thompson Ford, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 378, 380 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See text
accompanying notes 92, 102-04 infra for a discussion of the plaintiffs' willingness to pay
the costs involved in class action suits.
Is Hooks v. General Fin. Corp., 652 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); Brame v. Ray Bills
Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 582-87 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (where more than a pro rata share
of a recovery would reduce the amount that the remaining class members could receive).
16 KendIler v. Federated Dep't Stores, 88 F.R.D. 688, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also
83 F.R.D. at 380 (a conflict of interest may tempt the representative plaintiff to com-
promise the case contrary to the interests of the class).
17 In Cooper & Kirkham, Class Action Conflicts, 7 LrTCATION 35 (1981), the authors
caution that:
It is a grave mistake for the lawyer to minimize the personal commitment
required of the class plaintiff to obtain his client's permission to sue. You
should warn the client that if suit is filed, he will be a target of discovery
and liable for part of the costs... One client emerged so shaken at the lunch
break of his deposition that he asked to be dismissed as a plaintiff and to
participate only as a class member. Most important, explain that for all this
inconvenience, the client will receive no more of the recovery than a class
member.
18 Professor Paul Bergman of the University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law contends that these new cases do not go far enough to insure that class counsel will
not bebome the defacto class representative, exercising "unfettered discretion." Bergman,
supra note 9, at 257. Bergman argues that in some cases, at least, the courts should create
and certify groups or organizations to act as class representatives.
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However, even if the named representative party is not dis-
qualified on account of an interest that is antagonistic to the inter-
ests of the class, the quality of the representation received by ab-
sent class members is likely to turn on the experience and ability
of the class counsel. 19 Thus, the attorney who files an action with
class claims has an obligation to serve the interests of absent class
members, 20 as well as the interests of the named plaintiff.
Courts are particularly concerned with the rights of absent
class members, protected primarily by class counsel. "By grant-
ing class status, the court places the attorney for the named par-
ties in a position of public trust and responsibility, and in effect
creates an attorney-client relationship between the absentee mem-
bers and the attorney." 21 Counsel's all-important role in class ac-
tion litigation has spurred a number of courts to inquire into coun-
sels interests, competence, and professional integrity. Further-
more, a sampling of judicial opinions illustrates the skepticism,
if not outright hostility, that has surfaced from time to time in
the course of such inquiries. One court has stated that the Rule
23 class action "has resulted in miniscule recoveries by its intended
beneficiaries while lawyers have reaped a golden harvest of fees"
and that "[o]bviously the only persons to gain from a class suit are
not the potential plaintiffs, but the attorneys who will represent
them."s Arguments for regulating attorney misconduct in the
class action framework are compelling, given the "heightened sus-
ceptibilities of nonparty class members to solicitation amounting
to barratry as well as the increased opportunities of the parties
or counsel to 'drum up' participation in the proceedings."21 Such
19 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9
(3d Cir. 1973), the court went so far as to state: "Experience teaches that it is [the] counsel
for the class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these [class]
actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to the contrary [are]
pure sophistry."
20 Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1244, 1451
(1981).
21 Id., quoting Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546,
560 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added)'
22 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
23 Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 790 (E.D. La. 1977).
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pronouncements have led, almost inevitably, to new defense tac-
tics premised on perceived violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
B. Representation Likely to Be Found Less Than Adequate
Conflicts between the interests of class counsel and the interests
of absent class members, as well as factors reflecting on the compe-
tence of class counsel are discussed in this section of the Article.
Whether other, specific instances of unethical conduct have any
bearing on the "adequacy" of representation and, ultimately, the
propriety of class certification will be discussed in Part II of the
Article.
1. Counsel's Personal Interest
Given the fact that class counsel will almost always receive
more in attorney fees than any individual class member will re-
ceive as his or her pro rata share of a class recovery, an overwhelm-
ing majority of courts have refused to allow attorneys to act both
as class counsel and as class representatives. The conventional wis-
dom is that
[in any class action there is always the temptation for the attor-
ney for the class to recommend settlement on terms less favorable
to his clients because a large fee is part of the bargain .... Thus
Plaintiffs may stand to gain little as class representatives, but
may gain very much as attorneys for the class.2
More particularized conflicts have also precluded counsel from
assuming dual roles. For example, in Bachman v. Pertschuk,25
24 Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973).
See also Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1972), in which the
court remarked:
[Counsel] has not demonstrated competence to represent the class because
he seeks to be not only the attorney for the class and be awarded a fee for
his representation, he seeks in the same action, personal relief. The practice
involved does not seem to the Court to comport with the high quality of ob-
jectivity, duty and integrity required of lawyers practicing in this Court or
elsewhere. This case seems to involve a questionable method of soliciting legal
business and such solicitation should not be encouraged.
25 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977).
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plaintiff brought an action under Title VII alleging racial discrim-
ination against him by the FTC in connection with a promotion
decision. It was discovered that one of the class attorneys was em-
ployed by the FTC and thus was a member of the purported class
of "all blacks presently employed by, denied employment by, or
discharged from the FTC."0 This attorney faced a welter of con-
flicts of interest. First, the attorney faced the risk of violating duties
of loyalty and confidence owed to his employer and was so charged
in motions filed by the FTC.7 Second, the attorney faced a
potential risk, albeit remote, of being accused after the fact of pro-
viding inadequate representation in return for some personal bene-
fit.2 Finally, it was noted that the attorney's personal interest as
a class member was "limited to the interest of those persons present-
ly employed", and that "the possibility [existed] that he [might
have] favor[ed] a settlement... [giving] preference to the interests
of such persons over those denied employment by or discharged
from the FTC ... [or might have been tempted to] ... devote
a disproportionate amount of time preparing for trial on the issues
relevant to the subgroup to which he [belonged]," thereby rais-
ing doubts about whether he could adequately "'protect the in-
terests of the [entire] class.' "9
When counsel's personal claim or interests might conflict with
the interests of class members, counsel may not skirt the conflict
by withdrawing as class counsel while acting as a "behind the
scenes expert," 3o or continuing to claim attorney fees, albeit for
past work, in excess of his potential recovery as a member of the
class. 3
Similar conflicts of interest arise when the named representa-
tive is not the class attorney, but is instead a law partner, spouse,
relative, or employee of the attorney for the class. For example,
in Zyistra v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,32 the defendant challenged the
propriety of counsel's representation because one named plaintiff
2 Id. at 975.
27 Id. Cf Conway v. City of Kenosha, 409 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
2 437 F. Supp. at 975 n.3.
29 Id. at 977 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)).
30 Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 444 n.1 (D. Ariz. 1972).
31 Lowenschuss v. C.C. Bluhdorn, 78 F.R.D. 675, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
32 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 71
LEGAL ETHICS
was the wife of a partner, and another named plaintiff was a part-
ner in the law firm representing the purported class. The court
observed:
An attorney whose fees will depend upon the outcome of the case
and who is also a class member or closely related to a class mem-
ber cannot serve the interests of the class with the same unswerv-
ing devotion as an attorney who has no interest other than rep-
resenting the class members.-"
In addition to these readily identifiable conflicts, some courts
continue to be troubled by the spectre of the class action as a pro-
cedural device that all too often appears to disproportionately bene-
fit the class attorneys.34 Thus, concern about the propriety of cer-
tifying a class surfaces when the individual class members are un-
likely to receive any significant personal benefit and the only
named class representative is also class counsel, or a relative or
business associate of class counsel.-, However, even in cases in
which other class representatives are named, courts understand-
ably balk at certifying actions for class treatment if only miniscule
recoveries would be received by the non-attorney "clients," and
the "principal, if not the only, beneficiaries to the class action are
to be the attorneys. . . and not the individual class members."35
2. Simultaneous and Subsequent Representation
It is elementary that an attorney cannot simultaneously repre-
sent more than one client if the clients' interests are adverse or
33 Id. at 104 (emphasis added). Accord Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86,
94-95 (7th Cir. 1977); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1086 (3d Cir.
1976); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Stull v. Pool, 63 F.R.D.
at 704. But see Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581,
589 (E.D. Pa. 1975) in which the court held: "EW]hatever inadequacies may have existed
have been cured by the intervention of numerous other named plaintiffs. Nothing in the
record demonstrates that the intervenors were brought into this suit unethically or are
mere straw figures for plaintiffs counsel."
34 See, e.g., Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 30 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CaUalgh) at 1198,
in which the trial judge observed that when any possibility of legitimate benefit from a
lawsuit is substantially outweighed by the costs, "we are not dealing with a
lawsuit... [but] instead, intended or not, with a 'heist.'"
35 See, e.g., Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Card Sys., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38 In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
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potentially adverse.37 Moreover, an attorney cannot represent a
client in an action against a former client if any substantial
relationship can be shown to exist between the subject matter of
the former representation and that of the subsequent adverse rep-
resentation. 3s Both of these conflicts of interest are exacerbated
when one of the "clients" is a class consisting of absentees who
have no opportunity to actively participate in the proceedings. 39
Conflicts of interest involving simultaneous representation of
adversaries have arisen in a number of interesting ways in class
actions. For example, in Hawk Industries, Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. ,40 purchasers of the defendant corporation's stock sought to
maintain a class action in federal court against the corporation,
a securities analyst, a securities broker, and others on the theory
that defendants had selectively disclosed and acted upon material
nonpublic information. During proceedings on class certification,
defendants presented evidence that co-counsel for the plaintiffs
was also counsel in state court in a derivative action "on behalf
of [defendant] Bausch & Lomb."'41 The court observed:
[Counsel] is bound to pursue two actions to the best of his abili-
ty and as vigorously as possible. If both are successful, one ac-
tion would result in a recovery for the corporation [the derivative
action]; the other would result in a detriment to the corpora-
tion [the federal securities suit]. It is difficult to see how counsel
could retain his independence of professional judgment and loyal-
ty to his clients and their interests in both suits .... While the
firm ... is counsel for a plaintiff suing derivatively on behalf
of Bausch & Lomb in the state court, it cannotfurnish adequate
representation to the plaintiff class here. 2
A similar conflict arose in Chateau De Ville Productions v.
Tams-Witmark Music,43 an antitrust class action brought by the-
aters and playhouses against a corporation engaged in the licens-
37 Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) (simultaneous
representation of adverse interests prohibited per se).
38 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1976).
39 Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., 79 F.R.D. 246 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
40 59 F.R.D. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
41 Id. at 623-24.
42 Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
43 474 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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ing of musicals and others. The defendant licensing corporation,
Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., filed counterclaims against
two of the named plaintiffs, and then obtained leave to join the
parent company of one of the named plaintiffs as an additional
defendant to Tams-Witmark's cross-claim against its co-defendants
and alleged antitrust co-conspirators. As it turned out, the same
counsel represented this newly added party, Music Fair Enter-
prises, Inc., as well as the named plaintiff and the purported class.
As facts were developed during discovery, Music Fair appeared
to be yet another co-conspirator with defendant Tams-Witmark,
at least under the theory presented in the antitrust complaint. Ac-
cordingly, class counsel was presented with grounds for disqual-ification. 44
Conflicts arising as a result of prior representation of an adver-
sary present more subtle grounds for undermining class counsel.
These conflicts are based on counsel's obligation not to disclose
matters revealed by reason of the prior confidential relationship
with the former client, or to use confidences to the disadvantage
of the former client. Once it has been established that a substan-
tial relationship exists between the former representation and the
subsequent adverse representation, it is presumed that counsel pos-
sesses such confidences. 45 This prophylactic rule "enforce[s] the
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity and... guard[s] against the
danger of inadvertent use of confidential information."46 An ex-
ample of such a disabling conflict is illustrated by Hawkins v. Holi-
day Inns, Inc. 47 a class action brought by a group of hotel and
motel franchisees against their franchisor under sections 4 and 16
44 Although the court observed that conflicts are often exploited as "tools of the
litigation process," it was "better to forestall potential [conflicts that might arise as litiga-
tion proceeds] early in the litigation than to wait until the parties are deep in the discovery
process." 474 F. Supp. at 225-26. Cf. Conway v. City of Kenosha, 409 F. Supp. at 349:
[P~laintiff's unique position as individual plaintiff, would-be representative
plaintiff, and counsel for the class, as well as city attorney for the defendant
city, charged by law with conducting the legal business of the city and defen-
ding the city and its officers in all litigation would raise conflict of interest
problems ....
45 Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
46 Cerameo, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
47 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,150 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
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of the Clayton Act, asking for damages and other relief for alleg-
ed violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the
Clayton Act. Each of defendant's franchisees was a member of
the International Association of Holiday Inns, Inc. The antitrust
claims were being pursued by Milton Handler and the firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. At a hearing on mo-
tion of defendant Holiday Inns, it was established that the same
counsel had represented Holiday Inns in prior litigation, during
the course of which counsel were "made privy to the confidences
of Holiday Inns and their executives with regard to the entire spec-
trum of Holiday Inns' franchise activities, particularly in anti-trust
matters." 4
8
Finally, it should not be presumed that disabling conflicts arise
only from the simultaneous representation of adversaries or litiga-
tion against former clients in which the two litigations are "substan-
tially related." For example, in Sullivan v. Chase Investment Ser-
vices of Boston, Inc. 49 four representative plaintiffs sued for the
benefit of over 1500 clients of an investment advisory service, CIS,
alleging that CIS and others had committed actionable fraud with-
in the meaning of the federal securities laws. In the course of cer-
tification proceedings evidence was presented that class counsel
was pursuing another securities fraud case against CIS in another
federal district court. The court observed:
The possibility that assets and insurance of the defendants who
may have committed fraud against the plaintiffs will be insuffi-
cient to satisfy an alleged liability to the class of over $20 million
is great enough to influence litigation strategy. The... interest
[of plaintiffs in the parallel litigation] in collecting some money
from CIS before this class litigation is concluded is obvious, and
the diminution of the defendants' assets by payment to [those
plaintiffs] would equally obviously affect the interests of this
class. 0
48 Id. at 77,713-77,714.
49 79 F.R.D. at 246.
5 Id. at 258.
[Vol. 71
LEGAL ETmcs
3. The Attorney as a Witness
Disciplinary Rules 5-101-1 and 5-10252 provide in pertinent
part:
5-101(B): A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated
or pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a law-
yer in his firm ought to be called as a witness ....
5-102(A): If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of
his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and
his firm, if any, shall not continue the representation in the
trial ....
Potential violations of these disciplinary rules arise most often
when class counsel is also a member of the putative class. Whenever
it can be shown that counsel, as a class member, possesses informa-
tion relevant to the lawsuit, the opposing party or parties prob-
ably will call attention to a potential violation of the Code. As
the court observed in Bachman v. Pertschuck:-
As a member of the class with information relevant to this law-
suit, [class counsel] may be needed to testify. It might well be
a violation of ethics for him to do so; not doing so may hinder
the class's efforts to protect its interests. Accordingly, it would
be inappropriate to allow [counsel] to continue as attorney for
the class. 54
The tactical significance of this seemingly technical conflict
of interest is illustrated by Kriger v. European Health Spa,
Inc. , a class action brought against a health spa and a bank al-
leging violations of the Truth in Lending Act. The class consisted
of approximately 1600 people who had similar contractual arrange-
51 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (1978).
52 Id. at DR 5-102.
53 437 F. Supp. at 973.
54 Id. at 977 (emphasis added). See also Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D.
48, 56 (M.D.N.C. 1976): "While [counsel] might otherwise be able to demonstrate 'forth-
rightness and vigor,' the potential conflict of interest inherent in such a situation would
be obvious if [counsel's] testimony concerned either the material facts of this action or
facts that could not be elicited from other witnesses."
55 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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ments with the defendant spa. They satisfied the first three pre-
requisites of Rule 23(a).56 However, the named plaintiff was as-
sociated with the law firm representing the class, posing a poten-
tial violation of the fourth prerequisite, "adequate representation."
After observing that a "burdensome ethical problem" would be
raised if plaintiff were called as a witness in the litigation, the
court observed:
A person wishing to represent a class must be able to demonstrate
"the forthrightness and vigor... which the representative party
can be expected to assert."... This plaintiff has commenced
an action under a disability that no other member of the class
is likely to have-an inability to testify except at the cost of with-
drawal of counsel familiar with the case from its inception. It
is not enough to say that his testimony may not be needed; the
possibility of such a need makes him less capable of adequate
representation than others in the class. 57
Because of counsel's potential conflict, the court denied certifica-
tion of the action as a class action.s'
4. Competence and the Problem of Neglect
The requirement of "adequate representation" demands that
plaintiff's counsel be qualified, experienced, and able to conduct
the litigation.a9 Accordingly, the trial judge may inquire into
counsel's general qualifications, as well as counsel's conduct of the
particular litigation, prior to certifying the action for class
treatment. 60
5 FED R. CIv. P. 23(a) requires a showing that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.
57 56 F.R.D. at 105-06.
58 Id. at 106. Cf. Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. at 48 (action allowed
to proceed, on condition that counsel withdraw if an improper "dual role" were to develop
as the action proceeded to trial). See also Field v. Freedman, 527 F. Supp. 935 (D. Kan.
1981); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,150 (no showing that
counsel "ought" to be called as a witness).
59 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., 79 F.R.D. at 258.6 0 d.
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It is certainly unwise for inexperienced counsel to undertake
class litigation, or for a court to certify an action for class treat-
ment if counsel is unqualified or inexperienced. However, quali-
fication of counsel to represent the class can ordinarily be estab-
lished to the court's satisfaction early on, by way of affidavit.61
More difficult problems in assessing whether counsel can provide
"adequate representation" arise when the opponent of class cer-
tification points to specific errors or omissions by the class counsel
during the course of the proceeding that suggest incompetence or
neglect.62 Moreover, many courts have actually encouraged such
attacks by adding class action procedures by local rule.63
Taub v. Glickman64 is a leading case standing for the propo-
sition that certification may be denied for lack of "adequate rep-
resentation' although counsel's conduct is not "necessarily violative
of any canon, rule or statute."' In that case, plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule
10b-5, and section 352-C of the New York State General Business
Law, by omitting material information from a prospectus. The
court refused to certify the action as a class action for the follow-
ing reasons: 1) counsel's motion for class certification was not filed
61 Cf. In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum See. Litig., 484 F. Supp. 253,
264 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (adequacy of counsel question may arise again during litigation
on motion to deny class certification).
62 Id. at 264 n.1, wherein the trial judge observed:
[Counsel] has not shown a great deal of interest in this litigation, having
appeared for only one of three hearings held to date. In addition, [counsel]
attached to his memorandum in support of the motion for class certification
the opinion ... in which Judge Owen noted that [counsel's] firm had violated
certain "basic principles" of pleading with regard to allegations of fraud.
Finally, the defendants' claim that [counsel] has already committed several
errors in the conduct of this lawsuit is not wholly without substance.
63 Many federal district courts have adopted local rules requiring a motion to cer-
tify a class within 90 days of the filing of the complaint. See, e.g., Strozier v. General
Motors Corp., 21 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 1096 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (denial of class
certification for failure to so move). See also Lau v. Standard Oil Co., 70 F.R.D. 526,
527 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (references to local rule 103(b), providing that "counsel shall pro-
ceed with reasonable diligence to take all steps necessary to bring an action to issue and
readiness for pre-trial and trial").
64 14 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLAcHAN) 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5 Id. at 849.
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" '[a]s soon as practicable after ... commencement of... [the]
action,'" as required by Rule 23;6 2) counsel "defaulted in ap-
pearing in support of their own Rule 34 motion," 67 and "failed
to respond to defendant['s] . . . motion to extend its time to an-
swer;" 3) counsel submitted memoranda and motion papers
that were little more than "'boiler plate' document[s] prepared
without regard to the specific factual situations existing in each
case;" and 4) counsel submitted interrogatories consisting of
"mimeographed 'stock questions' with a freshly typed caption." 70
The court reasoned that "[s]uch an assembly line procedure in pro-
secuting [the] suit suggest[ed] that something less than a forthright
and vigorous approach [had] been taken. ... "71
In a similar case, Burns v. Georgia,7- the trial court dis-
missed the claims of one of several named plaintiffs with prejudice
and denied class certification on account of plaintiff's failure to
make discovery and failure to move for certification until a year
and a half after removal of the action to federal court, counsel's
display of ignorance of the local rules of court, and counsel's
demonstrated lack of familiarity with the federal rules governing
discovery.13
C. A Critique of Judicial Responses to Conflicts of Interest
Admittedly, the preceding survey of judicial opinions provides
little more than a skeletal guide for identifying conflicts of interest
in class action litigation. However, such a primer not only has some
6 Id. at 848. The action was commenced in 1967, and the motion was not filed until
February, 1970.
67 d. at 849.
68 Id.
69 1d.
7OId.
71 Id. See also Peak v. Topeka Hons. Auth., 78 F.R.D. 78, 84 (D. Kan. 1978).
72 25 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLAGHAN) 998 (N.D. Ca. 1977). The malpractice implica-
tions of such neglect have not yet surfaced in the reported opinions. In this regard, see
Burnside v. McCrary, 384 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (attorney not liable in
malpractice to former client for a dismissal of claims premised on a failure to move for
certification under a local rule and a failure to respond to a motion to dismiss class allega-
tions, when counsel had left the firm pursuing the action prior to the alleged acts of malprac-
tice, or was not personally responsible for said omissions).
73 25 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CALLAGHAN) at 1002.
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practical value, but also provides a vehicle for addressing the ques-
tion of whether typical judicial responses to conflicts of interest
are consistent with the avowed purpose of protecting the interests
of absent class members. In other words, a trial judge must deter-
mine what minimum supervisory actions are required to protect
putative class members. In many cases, a denial of class status or
decertification is unnecessary to protect the remedy's intended
beneficiaries; it may, in fact, conflict with their interests and en-
courage needless and disruptive skirmishing and delays in litiga-
tion.
To date, perhaps the most insightful analysis of conflicts of
interest in class action litigation appeared in a student commen-
tary in which the following observation was made:
In [many] cases, something is wrong with the lawyer, not the
class. Except for the class counsel-class representative cases in
which lawyer and class cannot be separated, the court should
disqualify counsel rather than [refuse to certify or] decertify the
class .... By contrast [a denial or certification or] decertifica-
tion should be used as a remedy when there is something wrong
with the class . . . [such as when] the named plaintiff's suit [is]
intensely personal [giving] the plaintiff a higher claim on class
counsel's loyalties.74
This hypothesis may be tested by reexamining the cases pre-
viously surveyed, bearing in mind all of the prerequisites of Rule
23, including the typicality of the claims of the plaintiffs and, in
the case of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the superiority of the class
action as a method of adjudication.75
74 Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, supra note 20, at 1454-55.
75 Federal Rule 23 (Class Actions) provides, with respect to what used to be termed
the "spurious" class action:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a.class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if... (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class. . . . (b) . . . and in addition:
(3) .. . that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (emphasis added).
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First, many conflicts of interest may be resolved by the inter-
vention of other class representatives. For example, in Sommers
v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association76 each
of the five original plaintiff couples in an antitrust class action
were employed by class counsel's law firm. Ordinarily, their rela-
tionship to the class attorney might require a denial of class cer-
tification. However, the court concluded that any inadequacies
were cured by the intervention of other named plaintiffs who were
not "mere straw figures for plaintiffs' counsel."7
Similarly, many conflicts, including conflicts of the "attorney
as representative" variety, may be cured by disqualification and
substitution of counsel. 78 Assuming that disqualification is time-
ly and will not "deprive the class of ... [irreplaceable expertise]
*. . developed during its pendency," 79 substitution of counsel has
often been found to be a sufficient remedy.80
Lowenschuss v. C. G. Bluhdorn8 l is a particularly interesting
case discussing the mechanics of substitution. Attorney Lowen-
schuss had initiated class action litigation, doubling as class rep-
resentative and class counsel. During the course of the litigation
he was forced to withdraw as class counsel because of his inherent
conflict of interest. At the time of his withdrawal, he attempted
to secure fees previously earned as class counsel by means of a side
agreement with the firm of Arnold Levin in which he also retained
"the right to approve or disapprove of any action affecting the
76 66 F.R.D. at 581.
77 Id. at 589. See Brick v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 547 F.2d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 1976). Cf.
Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. at 681. The intervention of a new class representative is,
in fact, what Professor Bergman has recommended, albeit on a broader scale. See text
accompanying note 141 infra.
78 See generally Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,150
(co-counsel and counsel for co-parties permitted to continue representation while one counsel
was disqualified for a conflict arising out of prior representation of another party). Hawk
Indus., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 59 F.R.D. at 619 (co-lead counsel without conflict
permitted to continue representation while other co-lead counsel estopped from acting
as such due to conflict arising out of simultaneous representation of opposing party in
unrelated action).
79 Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d at 1092 (3d Cir. 1976).
80 Id. at 1093. See also Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, 578 F.2d at 105; Brick v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 547 F.2d at 188 (dissenting opinion); Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. at 973.
81 78 F.R.D. at 675.
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rights of the class."82 Defendants moved to disqualify Lowen-
schuss as class representative and disqualify the firm of Arnold
Levin as class counsel. Noting that "an inordinate amount of time
[had] already been expended on issues unrelated to the merits of
the action," the court ruled:
[D]efendants' motion to disqualify [attorney] Lowenschuss as
class representative is granted. Under the circumstances and in
view of Canon 9 of the Code... requiring a lawyer to "avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety," Arnold Levin,
Esq. should withdraw as class counsel. The disqualification and
withdrawal should not be made immediately effective, how-
ever .... As Lowenschuss owed a fiduciary duty to the class,
it is his responsibilitiy to seek a substitute representative. Accord-
ingly, he is ordered to send a notice to all members of the class
... advising them of this decision and seeking a substitute rep-
resentative and/or intervenors [at his cost] .... After a substi-
tute class representative is certified, the order granting ... [dis-
qualification] will become effective.14
Finally, many instances in which the reason for denying class
status was that "counsel cannot be separated from the class" ac-
tually involved the prerequisites of "typicality" and "suitability."
The question of ethics was, in a sense, of secondary importance.
In Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,8 the court deem-
ed it unnecessary to "enunciate a belief that there are no cir-
cumstances in which it would be appropriate for an attorney to
represent a class ...both as a member thereof and as counsel"
because the attorney's claim was not "typical" of the class.86
Moreover, in many cases in which counsel seeks to serve as the
named plaintiff or defacto class representative for a class of plain-
tiffs who will receive, at most, miniscule recoveries, 87 the court
82 Id. at 677. The agreement recited that compensation for 6500 hours at $300 an
hour was "fair and reasonable under the circumstances." Id.
3Id. at 676-77. The disqualification motion was countered with a motion for sanc-
tions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
4 Id. at 678.
8' 574 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1978).
8 Id. at 1221 n.1.
87 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
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may be justified in holding that class treatment is not the "superior"
means of vindicating the plaintiffs' legitimate interests 88
II. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
UNDER THE CODE
If the requirement of "adequate representation" justifies ju-
dicial inquiry into counsel's professional competence, experience,
and ability to prosecute class action litigation,80 the question
arises as to whether specific instances of unethical conduct in the
initiation and prosecution of a particular lawsuit also are relevant
to the propriety of class certification. In other words, do specific
violations of Code provisions on the part of the named plaintiff's
counsel bear on the propriety of class certification in cases appar-
ently lacking conflicts of interest such as those just discussed, on
the theory that such violations raise doubts about counsel's abili-
ty to represent the interests of absent class members?
A. Specific Types of Misconduct
1. Maintenance
Disciplinary Rule 5-103 provides in pertinent part:
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated
or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee
financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may ad-
vance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination,
and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the
client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.10
The traditional justification for this ethical precept is rooted
in a conflicts of interest analysis: By advancing costs and expenses,
counsel may acquire an interest in the outcome of the litigation,
and may, in fact be tempted to settle a case on terms less advan-
88 In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d at 86; Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 56
F.R.D. at 549; Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. at 448.
89 See text accompanying notes 59-73 supra.
90 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1978).
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tageous to the client in order to secure his or her fee and ad-
vancements. In addition, the rule is thought to deter "frivolous
or speculative litigation designed to enrich [only the attorney bring-
ing the action."'91 In the abstract, the rule appears to have par-
ticular currency in class action litigation.92 On the other hand,
the "costs" associated with class action litigation, for which the
named representative must theoretically be responsible, can be
significant, including not only the costs of notice,93 but also the
costs of identifying potential class members. 4 Assuming, arguen-
do, that the typical, qualified class representative could bear such
expenses, it seems unlikely that such a person would willingly do
so in exchange for his or her share as a class member of any ultimate
recovery.95 It is no wonder that some courts have certified class
actions despite the fact that class counsel appeared to be advanc-
ing significant funds for the costs of litigation without any real
guarantee of repayment. 96
Despite these practical limitations on the utility of strict en-
forcement of DR 5-103(B) in the context of class action litigation,
a significant number of courts continue97 to permit discovery of
the source of funds maintaining a class action, and entertain mo-
tions challenging the ethics of class counsel9 8 A few examples of
how this "ethical" issue has been injected into litigation, and how
some courts have reacted to perceived violations of the disciplinary
rules, should illustrate the discomfort that may be visited on class
counsel.
91 Lynch, Ethical Rules in Flux: Advancing Costs of Litigation, 7 LITIGATION 19(1981).
92 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
93 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
0 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
95 Cf. Cooper & Kirkharn, supra note 17. See also Lynch, supra note 91, at 20.
9 See, e.g., Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 385
(E.D. Pa. 1974), wherein the court stated: "We cannot condone a policy which would
effectively limit class action plaintiffs to corporations, municipalities, or the rich."
07 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 678-79.
98 Informal Opinions of the American Bar Association have urged a strict applica-
tion of the Disciplinary Rule in the context of class actions. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1283 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ABA In-
formal Opinion], which states, "if the client does not agree to be ultimately responsible
for the costs so advanced, or authorize the lawyer to proceed with the suit as an individual
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In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co.,19 a suit
brought on behalf of the putative class against lending institutions
using certain accounting methods in connection with home mort-
gage loans, defense counsel moved to compel answers to the follow-
ing deposition questions propounded to a named plaintiff:
Q. [Hiave you agreed to pay the legal costs involved in this suit
if there should be any?
Q. [II]ave you agreed to reimburse your attorneys any legal costs
they might incur in the prosecution of this action?
Q. [I]ave you been told that you may be required to pay the
cost involved in the prosection of this action?
Q. Do you have an agreement with your attorney to repay any
court costs? °00
The Court not only held that such questions were "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation," but also ruled
that evidence of "solicitation and maintenance" could result in
a denial of class certification.101
Similarly, inquiries into the financial arrangements between
class counsel and the named representatives were allowed in two
recent cases denying class certification. In Parker v. George
Thompson Ford,02 the court denied certification primarily on
one, the lawyer should withdraw." See also ABA Informal Opinion 1326 (1975), which
states:
If the original plaintiff does not agree to assume the responsibility of
the cost of converting his individual action into a class action, the lawyer
should not bring or convert the suit to a class action unless the court permits
some other course of action or directs some other parties or class to bear the
costs of suit.
99 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
1o0 Id. at 637-38.
'0 Id. at 637. The court stated:
We think... that it is proper for courts to consider the ethical conduct of
plaintiffs' counsel in deciding whether to certify a class .... In assessing
the ability of the plaintiffs' counsel to carry out his fiduciary duties to ab-
sent class members we think the court should use its "broad administrative,
as well as adjudicative, power" as "guardian of the rights of the absentees"
to see that the absentees are represented by counsel who is ethically as well
as intellectually competent to represent them.
102 83 F.R.D at 378.
[Vol. 71
LEGAL ETHICS
account of an absence of "typicality"13 and "suitability,"' but
noted in passing that:
[the] record does not convincingly show that plaintiff is willing
and able to assume the costs and expenses associated with bring-
ing a class action. Plaintiffs counsel has allegedly promised to
bear responsibility for the costs of this suit, but this can be no
more than a guarantee of payment. It is not an adequate substi-
tute for assurance that plaintiff understands her potential obli-
gation of bearing the costs of a class action and is prepared to
underwrite these costs. 0 5
Other recent opinions echo the same concerns. In In re Mid-
Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,1 6 answers to defendants'
interrogatories asking whether plaintiffs were willing and able to
finance the costs of the actions, were equivocal and disclosed that
class counsel's policy was "not [to] seek to collect those costs" from
class representatives. 0 7 The court responded adversely to such ar-
rangements, along traditional conflicts of interest lines,'08 and
then went on to opine: "If the Court allows attorneys to pay for
a class action in which treble damages and attorney's fees are
already recoverable, there is a possibility that the proverbial 'am-
bulance chaser' might be turned into a 'Toyota chaser' . . 09
On the other hand, some courts have questioned whether a denial
of class status or decertification is an appropriate way to
"safeguard" the interest of absent class members, particularly in
light of the fact that few named plaintiffs can realistically be ex-
103 Id. at 380. A number of class plaintiffs were subject to counterclaims that the
named plaintiff would have no incentive to litigate.
10Id. at 382. Class members could have recovered more for themselves in individual
actions.
1 5d. at 380-81 (citing DR 5-103(B)).
'06 93 F.R.D. at 485.
107 Id. at 489.
11 The court wrote: "If the client is not financially responsible, the attorneys have
free reign over the prosecution of the class action. This is tantamount to the unacceptable
situation of the attorney being a member of the class of litigants while serving as counsel."
Id. at 490.
log Id. at 491. See also Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (N.D.
Ga. 1971) (plaintiffs may not shift the burden of paying for proper notice on the basis
of a "hindsight" victory based on the merits).
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pected to "willingly" bear the costs of litigation." 0 For example,
in Brame v. Ray Bills Finance Corp.,"' a class action brought
pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, the court suggested that
not every violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should
result in a denial of class status."2 Similarly, in Rode v. Emery
Air Freight,"' the court went so far as to suggest a compromise
solution of limiting the size of the putative class so as to "minimize
the conflicts which might be created by the advancement of signifi-
cant funds by plaintiffs' counsel."' 1
If the concern about class actions, in which otherwise qualified
representative plaintiffs are unable or unwilling to bear the costs
of litigation, is based on a fear that counsel will "take over the
litigation" for his or her own benefit, some enforcement mechanism
short of denying class certification would be more fitting. Unless
the class action device is to be abandoned in cases in which indi-
vidual class members are entitled to only small individual recov-
eries,1 5 alternative responses must be considered. Class size
might be restricted, or, as Professor Bergman has suggested,"1 an
organization of class members might be formed to act as the class
representative, thereby providing a "sturdier financial base" for
the action.
110 It has been held that once the named plaintiffs indicate a "willingness" to bear
such costs, further discovery of personal financial information should not be allowed. Such
discovery might "invade plaintiffs' privacy" and "have a 'chilling effect' upon" class ac-
tion lawsuits, contrary to congressional intent. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
22 FED. B. SERv. 2D (CALLucHAN) 63, 65 (S.D. Fla. 1975). Ironically, this approach skirts
the ultimate issue of whether it is realistic to apply DR 5-103 to class action litigation;
and such a judicial response to discovery unfairly rewards the class representative who
simply parrots a well-rehearsed catechism. But see Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973) ("willingness" on part of plaintiff insufficient of and by
itself).
11 85 F.R.D. at 568.
112 The court avoided the implications of DR 5-103(B) on the ground that plaintiffs'
attorneys were legal aid attorneys, and that public or charitable funds were being ad-
vanced as opposed to the personal funds of the attorneys. See also ABA Informal Opinion
1361 (1976) (no violation of DR 5-103(B) where Legal Aid Society advances money).
113 80 F.R.D. 314 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
"14 Id. at 317 (quoting Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D.
at 385).
351 Presumably these are the very cases for which Rule 23 was designed. See Gulf
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-100 n.11 (1981).
116 Bergman, supra note 9, at 274.
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Indeed, the propriety of some compromise solution short of
denial of class status is supported by the ABA Informal Opinion
1326,117 as well as Model Rule 1.8(e) of the new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct."" As previously noted, the ABA Opinion
generally condemns the prosecution of a class action out of counsel's
pocket. On the other hand, the Opinion permits counsel to solicit
funds from class members for expenses, as opposed to compensa-
tion, for preparation of class litigation, or for the costs of notice.
The Model Rule purports to bring the Code into line with reali-
ty, and deter wasteful and intrusive discovery of the arrangements
between class counsel and named plaintiffs.19 Specifically, Rule
1.8(e) provides: "A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance
to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that: (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses
of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter .. .
2. Solicitation
Although the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility do not permit a lawyer to recommend his or her em-
ployment to laypersons who have not sought his or her advice, 121
or permit a lawyer to request another to recommend his or her
employment,'2 Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A)(5) provides that: "If
success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in
the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others,
a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from those
contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder."123
117 See note 98 supra.
118 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.8 (E) (Final Draft 1982).
119 Lynch, supra note 91, at 20.
120 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.8(e) (Final Draft 1982). See aso
In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. at 485, discussed in text accom-
panying notes 106-09 supra, which stated: "Plaintiffs argue that the Court should refuse
to enforce DR 5-103(B), pointing to the trend of revision of that Disciplinary Rule .... The
Court's order [denying class certification] is without prejudice to plaintiffs' renewing their
motion should the law change... so as to allow the practices of plaintiffs" counsel ..
121 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1979).
12 Id. at DR 2-103(C).
123 Id. at DR 2-104(A)(5).
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The exact meaning of this pronouncement was examined in
ABA Informal Opinion 1280 in which the following problem was
submitted:
Your original client, a layman, approached your firm to rep-
resent him as plaintiff in a civil action against certain individuals
convicted of mail fraud for recovery of money he allegedly lost
to them as a result of the fraud. Because the initial outlay of
money to purchase a copy of the transcript of the criminal trial
and to contact and interview witnesses who are scattered across
the country would put a severe burden on your client's personal
finances, your client proposed seeking out others who had lost
money as a result of the mail fraud and soliciting their joinder
and financial assistance in the proposed litigation. This he did
by mailing to each member of the potential class a request for
an immediate financial contribution of $50 and for a limited
power of attorney authorizing your client on their behalf to re-
tain your services and assign to you a contingent fee of 35 per-
cent .... Your client did the actual mailing and bore the en-
tire expense of the solicitation; your only participation in the mat-
ter was that you drafted the limited power of attorney which
your client enclosed for the potential plaintiffs' signatures. As
of the date of your letter you had received some $2,250 from
approximately forty-five members of the class. You have not been
in touch with any of these potential clients except to acknowledge
receipt of their money and to answer their inquiries of you about
various aspects of the proposed action.12
Although the attorney in the above fa&t pattern obviously knew
that his client was contacting other class members and soliciting
their joinder, the ABA Informal Opinion found no objectionable
solicitation, on the theory that counsel had confined his commu-
nications with putative class members to "inquiries and acknowl-
edgements of receipt of their advances of costs."' 25 The Opinion
suggests that some pragmatic compromise may be struck, at least
in the context of class actions, so that counsel may fulfill his obliga-
124 ABA Informal Opinion 1280 (1973).
125 Id. See also ABA Informal Opinion 1326 (1975) (solicitation of funds to meet ex-
penses of class action suit, including attorney's fees). But see DR 1-102(A) ("A lawyer shall
not: ... (2) [c]ircumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another"). However, Opin-
ion 1326 did hold that compensation for the attorney could not be solicited.
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tion of zealous advocacy on behalf of the named representative
and potential class members without running afoul of time-
honored constraints.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of an impending change
in the rules governing "solicitation" in the context of class actions
came in the form of a United States Supreme Court opinion in
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard."2The case arose as a class action pre-
senting allegations of racial discrimination in employment against
the Gulf Oil Company and one of the unions representing em-
ployees. In 1976, Gulf entered into a conciliation agreement with
the EEOC regarding alleged discrimination against black and fe-
male employees at the refinery. As part of a compromise, Gulf
sent notices to employees eligible for back pay, offering a certain
amount to each person in return for releases of liability. One month
after the filing of the agreement, plaintiffs filed a class action on
behalf of all present and former black employees and black ap-
plicants who had been rejected for employment at the refinery.
Among the members of this purported class were many employees
who were already receiving offers of settlement from Gulf under
the conciliation agreement. When class counsel attended a meeting
of class members and recommended that they not settle their griev-
ances under the conciliation agreement, Gulf sought an order pro-
hibiting further communications by the parties or their counsel
with class members. 127 The district court issued an order bann-
ing communications with class members, citing as authority the
Manual for Complex Litigation section 1.41, without making any
findings of fact supporting the need for such a limitation."l
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court holding that the trial judge's order was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on protected expression. In turn, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, but on nonconstitutional
grounds.
While noting that Rule 23(d) gives a trial judge "broad authori-
ty to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate
126 452 U.S. at 89.
127 Id. at 92.
128 Id. at 93-96.
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orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties,"1 the
Court reasoned that an order limiting communications:
should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect
a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential inter-
ference with the rights of the parties ... to insure that the court
is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23.130
It further stated:
In the present case, we are faced with the unquestionable asser-
tion by respondents that the order created at least potential dif-
ficulties for them as they sought to vindicate the legal rights of
a class of employees. The order interfered with their efforts to
inform potential class members of the existence of this lawsuit,
and may have been particularly injurious-not only to respon-
dents but to the class as a whole-because the employees at that
time were being pressed to decide whether to accept a backpay
offer from Gulf that required them to sign a full release of all
liability for discriminatory acts. In addition, the order made it
more difficult for respondents, as the class representatives, to ob-
tain information about the merits of the case from the persons
they sought to represent ....
We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action litiga-
tion, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate
communications with potential class members. But the mere pos-
sibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a commu-
nications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the
prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules. There
certainly is no justification for adopting verbatim the form of
order recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, in
the absence of a clear record and specific findings of need. Other,
less burdensome remedies may be appropriate. Indeed, in many
cases there will be no problem requiring remedies at all. 131
The extent to which Gulf Oil may influence future changes
in the Code of Professional Responsibility and its application to
class actions is difficult to assess. However, many federal district
129 Id. at 100.
130 Id. at 101-02.
'31 Id. at 101-04.
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courts have adopted local rules, devised from the Manual of Com-
plex Litigation, prohibiting "all parties thereto and their counsel
:. . directly or indirectly, [from communicating] orally or in writ-
ing... concerning such action with any potential or actual class
member not a formal party to the action without the consent of
and approval of the communication by order of the court."132
The evils that such rules are intended to curb include solicitation
of legal representation, solicitation of fees and expenses,'-" solic-
itation by formal parties of requests by class members to opt out
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, and misrepresentation concerning
"the status, purposes and effects of the action," or of "actual or
potential court orders therein."' 14 While the Gulf Oil opinion
suggested that "an order requiring parties to file copies of non-
privileged communications to class members with the court may
be appropriate in some circumstances,"'"" the Court rejected the
view that a trial court "has the power to enter a ban on commu-
nications in any actual or potential class action as a prophylactic
measure ... ."131 The continued vitality of such local rules is
questionable at best. 137 On the other hand, there is certainly a
need for some policing of communications with class members. 13
132 Local Rule 2.12 of the Eastern District of Louisiana, upheld in the face of a con-
stitutional challenge in Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. at 786.
133 But see ABA Informal Opinion 1326 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes
117-19 supra.
134 Local Rule 2.12, supra note 132.
135 452 U.S. at 104 n.20.
136 Id. at 103-04 n.18. The language of the order issued in Gulf Oil was identical
to the language of the local rule discussed in Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. at 782, and quoted in text accompanying note 132 supra.
137 See Williams v. United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1981) (strik-
ing down local rule).
138 See Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. at 782, 791 n.8:
In the case at bar, we note that the minutes of the plaintiff organization
contain several patent misrepresentations of the suit's status and effect
.... [Declarations are made to the effect that there is an "overwhelming"
possibility the plaintiffs will prevail and that the contingency fee arrange-
ment is only made by "attorneys who are certain to win .... "
See also Vander Missen v. Kellogg Citizens Nat'l Bank, 481 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(court refused to allow publication of notice in the newspaper seeking witnesses "to aid
[plaintiff] in her proof of punitive damages").
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B. Conflicting Approaches to the Relevance of Specific Ethical
Misconduct
Judicial reactions to charges of barratry, maintenance and so-
licitation have been mixed. A number of decisions have suggested
that counsel's violations of Disciplinary Rules 5-103(B) and
2-104(A)(5) justify the denial of class status. 139 On the other
hand, many well reasoned decisions recognize that denying class
certification because of ethical misconduct not "extremely offen-
sive" and prejudicial to the interests of the class could place too
much emphasis on discovery and collateral litigation relating to
ethical issues. 140
If the courts are inclined to deny class status on account of
perceived ethical misconduct, the defense bar can hardly be faulted
for pursuing such issues tenaciously. However, the "pursuit" may
be quite wasteful and the prize, denial of class certification, too
draconian. For example, in Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clin-
ton, Inc. ,'14 defendants' initial motion to dismiss a securities
fraud action as a class action was denied, and the class was cer-
tified. The court then ordered that an opt-out notice be sent to
each unnamed plaintiff. When the prescribed notice was sent, it
was accompanied by an unauthorized letter from plaintiffs' at-
torneys who were representing eight potential class members in
three separate non-class actions pending in state court and aris-
ing from the same securities transaction. These individual plain-
tiffs, as well as some potential class members, then chose to opt-
out of the class action. Defendants thereupon filed a second mo-
tion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that class counsel had misled
139 E.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. at 485; Parker v.
George Thompson Ford, Inc., 83 F.R.D. at 378; Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 60 F.R.D. at 634; Korn v. Franchard Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 92,597
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Taub v. Glickman, 14 FED. R. SERV. 2D (CALLACHAN) at 847
(noting that counsel's solicitation in Korn could not be "passively ignored" in the case before
the court).
140 See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 22 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CALLAcHAN)
at 66, where, after noting that any incidental solicitation could not have resulted in pre-
judice warranting denial of class status, the court observed, "Since further discovery into
the area could only result in an administrative morass for all parties and for this court,
no substantial purpose can be seen for ordering such discovery .
141 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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the court regarding the intention of these eight state court plain-
tiffs to join in the class action. It was also suggested that their elec-
tion to opt-out was in "bad faith." The trial court concluded that
the election of these and other class members was permitted by
the court-approved notice, and that neither their election to opt-
out nor counsel's improper communications accompanying the no-
tice justified decertification or "dismissal." The court weighed the
gravity of the alleged "change of circumstances" against the poten-
tial impact of decertification on the absent class members:
The defendants would have the court dismiss the action as a class
action because plaintiffs' attorney sent this communication. It
must be remembered, however, that what the court is primari-
ly concerned with here is not the interests of the named plain-
tiffs and their attorneys but the interests of the members of the
class. It may be that many members of the class did not elect
to exclude themselves from this suit in reliance on the [court-
approved] notice... believing that their interests as members
of the class would be protected by the suit at bar. At the time
the present motion to dismiss was made the statute of limita-
tions against such claims was about to run and by now has ex-
pired. Thus the only protection available for members of the class
lies in the instant suit. I am not prepared to deny them this pro-
tection at this stage of the proceedings and on the present rec-
ord.142
In Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., the owners
of thirty-six retail grocery stores operating as defendant's fran-
chisees brought a class action alleging violations of the antitrust
laws. At pretrial, defense counsel suggested that the named plain-
tiffs had been solicited. This report prompted a hearing and dis-
missal of the case on motion of the defendant. The specific miscon-
duct involved arose in the following manner. The class attorney
had represented an association of the defendant's franchisees in
the Chicago area during 1968 and early 1969 to obtain advertis-
ing rebates owed by defendant to the association's members under
their franchise agreements. Counsel was successful in securing such
142 Id. at 625-26. Defendant thereafter moved to reargue the motion, which was
again denied.
143 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972).
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rebates, so it was natural for an officer of the association to invite
counsel to a meeting with some thirty-one members of the associa-
tion to discuss potential antitrust claims against defendant. Counsel
apparently recommended that such an action be pursued and the
members present voted to initiate and finance the litigation. How-
ever, when the association's president called counsel the next day,
it was decided that the association should request the joinder of
other store owners. Counsel prepared a letter signed by the associa-
tion president urging joinder but containing no mention of costs.
The letter did say no fee would be charged unless the suit suc-
ceeded. Persons who responded with authorization became the
named plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the class action. While noting that counsel com-
mitted a "slight breach of ethics," the court felt that such minor
misconduct "should not prejudice the rights of his clients."I The
court remarked:
Only the most egregious misconduct on the part of plaintiffs' law-
yer could ever arguably justify denial of class status. The ordinary
remedy is disciplinary action against the lawyer and remedial
notice to class members .... On remand the district court
should consider plaintiffs' request for class status without regard
to the pre-suit communication. If class designation is granted,
notice to the class members can remedy whatever misleading ele-
ments there may have been in the original letter. 145
This rationale is sound. While the defendant may have stand-
ing to challenge the propriety of attorney-financed class actions
other remedies less drastic than denial of class status may be avail-
able, including the intervention of other individual class repre-
sentatives or organizations, 146 substitution of counsel,147 or in
some cases, no judicial action at all.'4 Moreover, with respect to
solicitation, the interests of absent class members should be of para-
144 Id. at 931.
145 Id. at 932.
146 Cf. Bergman, supra note 9, at 271; ABA Informal Opinion 1326 (1975).
147 Cf. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. at 485.
148 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(e) (Final Draft 1982), the
relevant portion of which is contained in text accompanying note 120 supra.
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mount concern. Except in the most extreme instances of miscon-
duct, the use of corrective notices4 9 or disqualification and sub-
stitution of counsel 5 are preferred to denial of class certification.
III. OTHER RECURRING ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
A. The Strike Suit
Opponents of the class action characterize it as "legalized
blackmail."' 5' It must be conceded that there is a risk that class
claims may be asserted merely to provide a "port from which to
embark on a large scale fishing expedition."1 52 For example, it
has been said of antitrust class actions that:
by pulling everyone in an industry into a complex lawsuit drag-
net-style and then selling peace for a price below the costs of de-
fending the lawsuit, the plaintiff can often secure early settle-
ments, thereby augmenting its war chest while simultaneously
narrowing the number of parties and reducing its prosecution
costs. In this setting, the pragmatic business man is faced with
the dilemma of... capitulating to save litigation expenses. 50
A similar complaint was lodged by a senior partner of a large
Washington, D.C. law firm, whose experience in defending federal
securities law class actions led him to the conclusion that "the fun-
damental assumption underlying the finding of manageability in
149 See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d at 927 (corrective notice
is usual remedy).
150 See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 22 FED. R. SERV. 0 D tCALLACHAN)
at 66 ("The better disposition should be to substitute counsel to avoi 1 und ly delaying
reaching the merits and prejudicing plaintiffs' rights").
151 Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The 23rd Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971). Cf. Brown
v. Cameron-Brown Co., 30 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CALLACHAN) at 1181 (antitrust class action
characterized as "a heist").152 Peak v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 78 F.R.D. at 84.
153 Durham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of
Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 299, 306. See also Folding Cartons,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 28 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CALLAGHRA) 235, 244-45 (N.D. IlM. 1979)
commenting on the so-called "scavenger" antitrust case, in which the "singular key to suc-
cess ... is obtaining ... class certification").
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the certification of large user class actions is the court's belief that
the case will be settled prior to trial."'' 4 In a similar vein, the
author noted:
The potential exposure in broad class actions frequently exceeds
the net worth of the defendants, and corporate management nat-
urally tends to seek insurance against whatever slight chance of
success plaintiffs may have. Such insurance is usually available
for a comparatively modest premium in the form of a settlement
with the attorney who initiated the litigation and who purports
to speak for vast numbers of people who have not retained
him.' 5
Because frivolous claims may provide ample leverage for coerc-
ing unmerited settlements, a number of courts have emphasized
that the attorney filing a class action complaint "has a professional
responsibility before signing and filing that complaint to deter-
mine that there is a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the class
action allegations."' 6 This duty of care is already imposed by
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme
Court recently adopted amendments to that rule encouraging its
use as a sanctioning mechanism for deterring groundless litiga-
tion. 5 7 The amended rule provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and beliefformed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact .... If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule ... the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanc-
tion, which may include an order to pay to the other party...
154 Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool Or Engine Of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375,
388 (1973).
' Id. at 389-90.
15 Peak v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 78 F.R.D. at 83 (quoting Barnett v. Laborers' Int'l
Union, 75 F.R.D. 544, 545 (W.D. Pa. 1977)).
157 See Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Controls of Adversary
Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rules
of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 625, 642 (1982).
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the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, ...including a reasonable attorney's
fee. 158
This rule should help the courts police abuses of the class ac-
tion device in several ways. First, new sanctions provided in the
rule will deter counsel from filing frivolous claims against mul-
tiple defendants, "dragnet-style," and then settling with the in-
dividual defendants for some nuisance value. 19 For example, in
Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,'16 class action attorneys filed a complaint naming as defen-
dants 177 mortgage and thrift institutions, alleging that their use
of the "escrow" method of collecting tax prepayments violated fed-
eral antitrust laws.'61 The defendants were selected from a local
telephone book. Forty-six of the defendants were later dismissed
voluntarily.162 On motion, the trial court required plaintiffs
counsel personally to reimburse the dismissed defendants for the
costs and expenses incurred in appearing and defending. 163
Second, the new rule should encourage counsel to tailor the
class allegations of the complaint to the facts of the particular case,
and deter counsel from relying on an initial round of depositions
or interrogatories to "discover a claim."'
158 51 U.S.L.W. 4501-02 (May 3, 1983) (emphasis added). The new amendments
will take effect on August 1, 1983 if approved by. Congress.
159 See text accompanying notes 147-50 supra.
160 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
161 Id. at 982.
162 Id. at 983. The opinion does not reveal whether any of these defendants "bought
their peace" for some nominal sum, but does suggest that none used the "escrow" method
complained of.
163 Id. at 983. But see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Rule 11 .. . provides no authority for awarding attorneys' fees against an un-
successful litigant); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19 FED. R. SERv. 2D (CALLAcHAN) 466,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that attorneys' fees may not be awarded as a sanction under
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 in its current form).
164 See Barnett v. Laborer's Int'l Union, 75 F.R.D. at 545, in which the court
observed:
While it may sometimes be necessary to indulge in discovery to prepare
[materials in evidentiary form to support class certification] the amount of
such discovery should be limited to this purpose. The time allowed... should
not be used by the plaintiff's counsel to engage in a fishing expedition to
determine whether or not there is any factual support for his allegations.
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B. Defense Counsel's Contacts with Class Members
As previously noted in connection with solicitation, the Manual
for Complex Litigation recommended that courts prohibit unap-
proved contacts between counsel and potential and actual class
members as a matter of course. 1' 5 While the United States Su-
preme Court opinion in Gulf Oil v. Bernard'O prevents a court
from imposing such a gag order on class counsel absent specific
findings of abuse, the case does not directly discuss the propriety
of orders purporting to restrict defense counsel's contacts with class
members. Class counsel may desire an order restricting his oppo-
nent's contacts with class members to prevent the defendant from
buying off individual absent class members. By purchasing indi-
vidual claims before certification, the defense may be able to cause
sufficient "opt-outs" to reduce the size of the class to the point
where joinder of the remaining members is practicable. This may
result in a dismissal of class claims without judicial review of the
settlements.'6
Not surprisingly, courts that have considered the propriety of
such contacts have reached differing conclusions. This is in part
due to the difficulty of applying the provisions of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in the context of class actions. Disciplinary
Rule 7-104 of the Code provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the sub-
ject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented
by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to
do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of his client. 68
165 See text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
166 452 U.S. at 89.
167 3 H. NEWBERG. CLASS ACTIONS § 5030 (1977).
16 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1981).
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Courts in early cases dealing with defense efforts to settle in-
dividual claims of absent class members before certification were
suspicious of class counsels' demands for protective orders. In a
leading case, Judge Friendly stated:
Plaintiffs... (assertion] that once a plaintiff brings a suit on
behalf of a class, the court may never permit communications
between the defendant and other members, even when, as here,
both desire this, is in conflict... with elementary considera-
tions of common sense .... Indeed, we are unable to perceive
any legal theory that would endow a plaintiff who has brought
what would have been a "spurious" class action under former
Rule 23 with a right to prevent negotiations of settlements be-
tween the defendant and other potential members of the class
who are of a mind to do this; it is only the settlement of the class
action itself without court approval that F.R. Civ. P. 23(e)
prohibits. 169
In this and other cases following its rationale, plaintiff's counsel
apparently did not rely on the disciplinary rule as the lynchpin
for a protective order.
The problem in applying the disciplinary rule in the class ac-
tion context is the difficulty of identifying class counsel's client.
If a court concludes that counsel's client is the representative par-
ty, a simple offer to settle the potential claim of an absent class
member, unencumbered by other "advice," may be viewed as per-
missible. On the other hand, if class counsel is deemed to work
"for absent class members,"' 70 such contacts may be said to be
within the ambit of the disciplinary rule.
The former view, that absent class members are not repre-
sented parties in the formal sense of the disciplinary rule, at least
prior to class certification, was adopted in Winfield v. St. Joe Paper
Co.,'7' a Title VII action in which plaintiff soughi to prevent
defendant from "contacting members of the proposed class in order
to obtain relevant information from them."'172 The court refused
169 Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972).
Accord Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
170 See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, supra note 20, at 1447.
171 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1093 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
172 Id. at 1094.
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to apply DR 7-104(A)(1) to the facts of the case, noting that the
absent class members had not retained class counsel, and were "rel-
atively passive beneficiaries of the efforts of the plaintiffs in their
behalf."'17 This relatively mechanical reasoning appears logical
if the plaintiff's motion to certify the class is still pending, and
appears to be consistent with Gulf Oil which recognized the need
to consider the legitimate interests of the parties.
More difficult problems of analysis arise when an action has
already been certified as a class action. Impervious Paint Industries
v. Ashland Oil,174 a "multiple-defendant civil anti-trust" class ac-
tion, is a case in point. After the action had been certified as a
class action, the court had entered a "communications ban" pur-
suant to the Manual for Complex Litigation. However, some of
the defendants moved to vacate the ban, citing as authority the
Fifth Circuit decision in Bernard v. Gulf Oil.175 The trial court
thereupon agreed to vacate the broad order banning communica-
tions, while advising counsel of the ethical proscriptions contained
in the Code. Sometime thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel moved for
an order prohibiting one of the defendants from contacting class
members and "threatening" them with "discovery and other legal
procedures" should they fail to opt out.176 The court appeared to
recognize the difficulty of applying DR 7-104(A) (1) literally in the
class action context; class counsel "represents" absent class members
in the sense that he or she must avoid compromising their rights
but for other purposes, such as solicitation, they must be treated
to some extent as non-clients. The court correctly observed, how-
ever, that defense counsel did have some responsibilities pursuant
to DR 7-104 "read as a whole":
It is essential that the class members' decision to participate or
to withdraw be made on the basis of independent analysis of his
own self-interest. It is the responsibility of the Court as a neutral
arbiter and of the attorneys in their adversary capacity to insure
this type of free and unfettered discretion .... It must be noted
that defendants vigorously campaigned to have included in the
173 Id.
174 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
175 Id. at 722, citing Bernard v. Gulf Oil, 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980).
176 Id. at 722.
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notice the warning that class members might be subject to
discovery or other legal procedures... [but] this provision was
rejected by the Court .... Bernard v. Gulf Oil ... held that
prior restraints were justifiable in exceptional circumstances and
by a showing of direct, immediate and irreparable harm. We
now find such circumstances to exist. 177
In short, the court did not become needlessly embroiled in the ques-
tion of whether the absent class members were "parties" repre-
sented by class counsel for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1). Instead,
the court relied upon DR 7-104(A)(2) and its supervisory power
under Rule 23 to insure that the absent class members would be
free to make an independent decision to "opt-out" or participate
in the class action.
C. Settlement
Even if a class action has been commenced in good faith and
the class allegations are well grounded in fact, "the named plain-
tiffs and their counsel are often tempted [to sacrifice] the interests
of the previously asserted class for private gain,"'178 in the form
of a premium for the named plaintiffs, 179 or a quick fee for the
attorney. 180
Federal Rule 23(e) was drafted to insure that sweetheart settle-
ments will not be entered into to the detriment of absent class mem-
bers whether or not the class action has reached the certification
177 508 F. Supp. at 723.
178 O'Kelly, Class Actions: Proposals for New Rules of Professional Responsibility,
5 LTGATION No. 2, 25 (1979). There is substantial evidence that some counsel merely
threaten to add class allegations in the hope of obtaining leverage in negotiating the settle-
ment of individual claims. Litigation attorneys should note well ABA Informal Opinion
1039 (1968), which suggests that a plaintiffs lawyer may not sign an agreement which
settles his clients' claims when the settlement agreement contains a convenant that counsel
will not represent others, in individual or class suits, against the settling defendants ab-
sent court approval. Neither may a defendant's attorney demand such a covenant absent
court approval.
179 Cf. Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. IMI. 1970), discussed in
3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 167, at § 5020b.
180 Of course, counsel may wish to delete class claims that were improvidently ad-
vanced. See, e.g., Sutton v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D. Ohio
1978).
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stage.'8' It provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed compromise shall be given to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs."182
It is now well-settled that named plaintiffs may not circum-
vent the necessity of obtaining court approval of any settlement
or dismissal of class allegations by such simple expedients as amend-
ing the pleadings83 or entering a voluntary dismissal of class
claims prior to certification.18 The more troublesome question is
whether the language of Rule 23(3) relating to "notice of [any]
proposed compromise" is mandatory.
Several commentators have urged that notice to class members
should be discretionary.1 While it is difficult to reconcile this
view with the language of the rule,18 recent decisions have
adopted this "functional approach."'18 The apparent rationale of
allowing no notice when the class is not yet certified is that "it
is unlikely that absent class members actually rely upon uncerti-
fied class actions."'188 Furthermore, because the filing of class al-
legations tolls the statute of limitations for the benefit of the
class,189 "there is little danger of prejudice to the class ... where
there has been no class certification, [and] where the dismissal is
without prejudice.190
181 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 167, at § 5020 (citing Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d
161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970)).182 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
183 Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. at 481.
184 Wallican v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. at 492.
185 Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Pre-Certification Stage: Is Notice
Required?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 303 (1978); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1797 (1972). See also O'Kelly, supra note 178; Forde, Settlement of
the Class Action, 5 LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 23.
186 The argument would have to be made that the court's power to regulate the
"manner" of giving notice provides the court with power to dispose of notice altogether.
187 Wallican v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. at 493.
188 O'Kelly, supra note 178, at 26. But see Rothman v. Could, 52 F.R.D. 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
189 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker 51 U.S.L.W. 4746 (U.S. June 14, 1983).
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
190 Forde, supra note 185, at 24. See also Wallican v. Waterloo Community School
Dist., 80 F.R.D. at 494, in which the court noted that "no danger of collusion between
the parties or of a 'sell out' of the asserted class appears to be present here. Additionally,
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Inasmuch as the court must approve any settlement or dis-
missal, the trial judge will have ample opportunity to weigh the
need for notice against the potential costs, delay, and supervisory
time. 91 Presumably the necessity for obtaining court approval
before class claims are aborted will deter counsel from acting con-
trary to the interests of absent class members.
D. Discovery and the Problem of Delay
It has been said that "nowhere are the rules of discovery more
susceptible to abuses and misapplication" than in class action lit-
igation.9 2 Boilerplate class allegations can serve as a launching
pad for burdensome discovery directed at obtaining nuisance settle-
ments. 193 By the same token, "[t]he defense lawyer eager to stall
and break the will of named plaintiffs-and thus the class-is in
especially good position to misuse willfully... discovery [on the
merits, after certification] ... aimed at [absent class mem-
bers]."194 The threat of discovery from absent class members may
coerce "opt-outs" in so-called "spurious" class actions. 195 In ad-
dition, the delay and expense associated with wide-ranging dis-
covery from class members may undermine the representative
plaintiffs' lawsuit by a process of attrition. 196
it appears that this dismissal is well within any statute of limitations period so that ... any
putative class member may still bring suit upon the same controversy."
191 See Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
192 Gruenberger, Discovery from Class Members: A Fertile Field for Abuse, 4 ITIGA-
TION, Fall 1977, at 35.
193 See text and accompanying notes 152-64 supra.
194 Gruenberger, supra note 192, at 35. Of course, precertification discovery directed
at the resolution of "threshold issues concerning class certification" may also be dilatory.
Cf. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 167, at § 1010.3f.
195 See Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. at 720 (discussed in
text accompanying notes 174-77 supra). See also United States v. Trucking Employers,
Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.D.C. 1976).
196 Cf. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975):
The district judge may reasonably control discovery to keep the suit within
manageable bounds, and to prevent fruitless fishing expeditions with little
promise of success .... We think procedures can be found and used which
will provide fairness to the defendants and a genuine resolution of disputed
issues while obviating the danger of subverting the class action with delay-
ing and harassing tactics ....
For an account that could be subtitled "Discovery Wars," see Gruenberger, supra note
192, at 53.
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Securities fraud class actions are the most likely candidates
for defense demands for discovery from individual class members,
since individual investor reliance and causation may be placed in
issue. 19 7 Out of concern that the "representative" nature of the
action and its efficiencies as a litigation vehicle not be subverted
by "class" discovery, several courts have denied such discovery on
the theory that absent class members are not "parties" to the law-
suit. 98 However, while Rule 23 does not designate absent class
members "parties," it also does not say that they are not parties.
If discovery is to be restricted, it ought to be restricted on some
other, more pragmatic, ground.'9
Accordingly, most courts now recognize that a decision to
allow or disallow discovery from unnamed class members ought
to turn on the need of the proponent of discovery, for informa-
tion necessary to make its case, weighed against the competing
interests of the class members in remaining "passive":
The evolving view. . . seems to be that the court has the power
* . . to permit reasonable discovery by way of interrogatories of
absent class members when the circumstances of the case justify
such action .... [The] party seeking such discovery must dem-
onstrate its need for the discovery for purposes of trial of the issues
common to the class, that the discovery not be undertaken with
the purpose or effect of harassment of absent class members or
of altering the membership of the opposing class, and that the
interrogatories be restricted to information directly relevant to
the issues to be tried ... with respect to the class action aspects
of the case .... Discovery is not to be allowed as a matter of
course... but only when the Court is satisfied that the required
showing has been made.2'
By placing the burden of justifying discovery from unnamed
absent class members on the proponent of the discovery, and by
allowing only the least intrusive and least expensive discovery de-
197 See Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
198 See, e.g., id. at 132.
199 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 507 F. Supp. 1146,
1160 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (argument that absent class members are not parties because FED.
B. Civ. P. 23 does not designate them as such is "specious at best").
20 United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. at 104 (emphasis added).
See also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (collecting cases).
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vice to be used, courts have exercised their inherent power to reg-
ulate the scope and methods of discovery. That power would be
expressly "granted" in the new amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure aimed at curbing discovery abuse. 2'
CONCLUSION
This article has cataloged many of the ethical dilemmas that
arise in the course of class action litigation as well as the tactical
significance of perceived ethical violations. Frequently, alert de-
fense counsel can exploit the misconduct of an opponent to defeat
class certification or delay or defeat a class action by a process
of attrition. All too often, courts encourage unproductive proce-
dural maneuvering by refusing to certify actions for class treat-
ment when other less drastic remedies are more appropriate.
Courts are now reassessing the significance of ethical miscon-
duct in the prosecution of class actions in order to weigh the harm
of particular abuses in light of the interests of absent class members.
Moreover, many courts are questioning the propriety of defense
contacts with class members, as well as class-wide discovery, to
insure that absent class members will not be unfairly discouraged
from exercising their right to participate as members of a class.
At the same time, certain changes in the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Civil Procedure have been pro-
posed that may help eliminate abuses attributed to class action
litigation without destroying the utility of Rule 23. Only time and
continued experience will tell if these new approaches will "re-
habilitate" the class action in the eyes of the bench, the bar, and
the public.
201 See 51 U.S.L.W. 4501-02. Rule 26(b) provides the court with authority to limit
the use of discovery if "(iff) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." Moreover, Rule 26(g) mandates
that every request for discovery be signed by counsel, whose signature certifies that the
request is "(2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... See also Underwood,
supra note 157, at 654-68.
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